Complete Works of Frontinus Read online

  The Complete Works of

  FRONTINUS

  (c. 40–103 AD)

  Contents

  The Translations

  STRATAGEMS

  THE AQUEDUCTS OF ROME

  The Latin Texts

  LIST OF LATIN TEXTS

  The Dual Texts

  DUAL LATIN AND ENGLISH TEXTS

  The Biography

  THE LIFE AND WORKS OF SEXTUS JULIUS FRONTINUS by Charles E. Bennett

  The Delphi Classics Catalogue

  © Delphi Classics 2015

  Version 1

  The Complete Works of

  SEXTUS JULIUS FRONTINUS

  By Delphi Classics, 2015

  COPYRIGHT

  Complete Works of Frontinus

  First published in the United Kingdom in 2015 by Delphi Classics.

  © Delphi Classics, 2015.

  All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of the publisher, nor be otherwise circulated in any form other than that in which it is published.

  Delphi Classics

  is an imprint of

  Delphi Publishing Ltd

  Hastings, East Sussex

  United Kingdom

  Contact: [email protected]

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  The Translations

  The multiple arches of the Pont du Gard in Roman Gaul, modern-day southern France.

  STRATAGEMS

  Translated by Charles E. Bennett

  Sextus Julius Frontinus (c. AD 40 – 103) was one of the most distinguished Roman senators of the late 1st century AD, who is now chiefly remembered as an author of technical treatises. In AD 70, Frontinus became a praetor and five years later was sent to Britain to succeed Quintus Petillius Cerialis as governor. He subdued the Silures and other tribes of Wales hostile to Roman invasion, establishing a new base at Caerleon for Legio II Augusta and a network of smaller forts fifteen to twenty kilometres apart for his auxiliary units. One of these forts would have been Luentinum, which controlled the gold mine of Dolaucothi, worked by numerous aqueducts. In 78, he was succeeded by Gnaeus Julius Agricola, the father-in-law of the famous historian Tacitus. His military life at this time would help provide material for his first literary work.

  Stratagems (Strategemata) is a collection of examples of military stratagems from Greek and Roman history, compiled for the use of generals. Frontinus draws on his own experience as a general in Germania under Domitian, though similarities between the anecdotes he records and versions of other Roman authors like Valerius Maximus and Livy suggest that he drew mainly on literary sources. The authenticity of the fourth book has been challenged.

  Bust of Julius Caesar (100-44 BC), one of the principle generals referenced by Frontinus throughout ‘Stratagems’

  CONTENTS

  BOOK I

  I. On Concealing One’s Plans

  II. On Finding Out the Enemy’s Plans

  III. On Determining the Character of the War

  IV. On Leading an Army through Places Infested by the Enemy

  V. On Escaping from Difficult Situations

  VI. On Laying and Meeting Ambushes while on the March

  VII. How to conceal the Absence of the Things we lack, or to supply Substitutes for Them

  VIII. On Distracting the Attention of the Enemy

  IX. On Quelling a Mutiny of Soldiers

  X. How to Check an Unseasonable Demand for Battle

  XI. How to arouse an Army’s Enthusiasm for battle

  XII. On Dispelling the Fears Inspired in Soldiers by Adverse Omens

  BOOK II

  I. On choosing the time for battle

  II. On Choosing the Place for Battle

  III. On the Disposition of Troops for Battle

  IV. On creating panic in the enemy’s ranks

  V. On Ambushes

  VI. On Letting the Enemy Escape, lest, Brought to Bay, He Renew the Battle in Desperationa

  VII. On Concealing Reverses

  VIII. On Restoring Morale by Firmness

  IX. On Bringing the War to a Close after a Successful Engagement

  X. On Repairing One’s Losses after a Reverse

  XI. On Ensuring the Loyalty of Those Whom One Mistrusts

  XII. What to do for the Defence of the Camp, in case a Commander lacks Confidence in his Present Forces

  XIII. On Retreating

  BOOK III

  I. On Surprise Attacks

  II. On Deceiving the Besieged

  III. On Inducing Treachery

  IV. By What Means the Enemy may be Reduced to Want.

  V. How to Persuade the Enemy that the Siege will be Maintained

  VI. On Distracting the Attention of a Hostile Garrison

  VII. On Diverting Streams and Contaminating Waters

  VIII. On Terrorizing the Besieged

  IX. On Attacks from an Unexpected Quarter

  X. On Setting Traps to Draw out the Besieged

  XI. On Pretended Retirements

  XII. On Stimulating the Vigilance of One’s Own Troops

  XIII. On Sending and Receiving Messages

  XIV. On Introducing Reinforcements and Supplying Provisions

  XV. How to Produce the Impression of Abundance of what is Lacking

  XVI. How to Meet the Menace of Treason and Desertion

  XVII. On Sorties

  XVIII. Concerning Steadfastness on the Part of the Besieged

  BOOK IV

  I. On Discipline

  II. On the Effect of Discipline

  III. On Restraint and Disinterestedness

  IV. On Justice

  V. On Determination (“The Will to Victory”)

  VI. On Good Will and Moderation

  VII. On Sundry Maxims and Devices

  Bust of Alexander the Great (356 BC-323 BC), another principle general referenced by Frontinus throughout ‘Stratagems’

  BOOK I

  Since I alone of those interested in military science have undertaken to reduce its rules to system, and since I seem to have fulfilled that purpose, so far as pains on my part could accomplish it, I still feel under obligation, in order to complete the task I have begun, to summarize in convenient sketches the adroit operations of generals, which the Greeks embrace under the one name strategemata. For in this way commanders will be furnished with specimens of wisdom and foresight, which will serve to foster their own power of conceiving and executing like deeds. There will result the added advantage that a general will not fear the issue of his own stratagem, if he compares it with experiments already successfully made.

  I neither ignore nor deny the fact that historians have included in the compass of their works this feature also, nor that authors have already recorded in some fashion all famous examples. But I ought, I think, out of consideration for busy men, to have regard to brevity. For it is a tedious business to hunt out separate examples scattered over the vast body of history; and those who have made selections of notable deeds have overwhelmed the reader by the very mass of material. My effort will be devoted to the task of setting forth, as if in response to questions, and as occasion shall demand, the illustration applicable to the case in point. For having examined the categories, I have in advance mapped out my campaign, so to speak, for the presentation of illustrative examples. Moreover, in order that these may be sifted and properly classified according to the variety of subject-matter, I have divided them into three books. In the first are illustrations of stratagems for use before the battle begins; in the second, those that relate to the battle itself and tend to effect the complete subjugation of the enemy; the third contains stratagems con
nected with sieges and the raising of sieges. Under these successive classes I have grouped the illustrations appropriate to each.

  It is not without justice that I shall claim indulgence for this work, and I beg that no one will charge me with negligence, if he finds that I have passed over some illustration. For who could prove equal to the task of examining all the records which have come down to us in both languages! And so I have purposely allowed myself to skip many things. That I have not done this without reason, those will realize who read the books of others treating of the same subjects; but it will be easy for the reader to supply those examples under each category. For since this work, like my preceding ones, has been undertaken for the benefit of others, rather than for the sake of my own renown, I shall feel that I am being aided, rather than criticized, by those who will make additions to it.

  If there prove to be any persons who take an interest in these books, let them remember to discriminate between “strategy” and “stratagems,” which are by nature extremely similar. For everything achieved by a commander, be it characterized by foresight, advantage, enterprise, or resolution, will belong under the head of “strategy,” while those things which fall under some special type of these will be “stratagems.” The essential characteristic of the latter, resting, as it does, on skill and cleverness, is effective quite as much when the enemy is to be evaded as when he is to be crushed. Since in this field certain striking results have been produced by speeches, I have set down examples of these also, as well as of deeds.

  Types of stratagems for the guidance of a commander in matters to be attended to before battle:

  I. On concealing one’s plans.

  II. On finding out the enemy’s plans.

  III. On determining the character of the war.

  IV. On leading an army through places infested by the enemy.

  V. On escaping from difficult situations.

  VI. On laying and meeting ambushes while on the march.

  VII. How to conceal the absence of the things we lack, or to supply substitutes for them.

  VIII. On distracting the attention of the enemy.

  IX. On quelling a mutiny of soldiers.

  X. How to check an unseasonable demand for battle.

  XI. How to arouse an army’s enthusiasm for battle.

  XII. On dispelling the fears inspired in soldiers by adverse omens.

  I. On Concealing One’s Plans

  [1] Marcus Porcius Cato believed that, when opportunity offered, the Spanish cities which he had subdued would revolt, relying upon the protection of their walls. He therefore wrote to each of the cities, ordering them to destroy their fortifications, and threatening war unless they obeyed forthwith. He ordered these letters to be delivered to all cities on the same day. Each city supposed that it alone had received the commands; had they known that the same orders had been sent to all, they could have joined forces and refused obedience.

  [2] Himilco, the Carthaginian general, desiring to land in Sicily by surprise, made no public announcement as to the destination of his voyage, but gave all the captains sealed letters, in which were instructions what port to make, with further directions that no one should read these, unless separated from the flag-ship by a violent storm.

  [3] When Gaius Laelius went as envoy to Syphax, he took with him as spies certain tribunes and centurions whom he represented to be slaves and attendants. One of these, Lucius Statorius, who had been rather frequently in the same camp, and whom certain of the enemy seemed to recognize, Laelius caned as a slave, in order to conceal the man’s rank.

  [4] Tarquin the Proud, having decided that the leading citizens of Gabii should be put to death, and not wishing to confide this purpose to anyone, gave no response to the messenger sent to him by his son, but merely cut off the tallest poppy heads with his cane, as he happened to walk about in the garden. The messenger, returning without an answer, reported to the young Tarquin what he had seen his father doing. The son thereupon understood that the same thing was to be done to the prominent citizens of Gabii.

  [5] Gaius Caesar, distrusting the loyalty of the Egyptians, and wishing to give the appearance of indifference, indulged in riotous banqueting, while devoting himself to an inspection of the city and its defences, pretending to be captivated by the charm of the place and to be succumbing to the customs and life of the Egyptians. Having made ready his reserves while he thus dissembled, he seized Egypt.

  [6] When Ventidius was waging war against the Parthian king Pacorus, knowing that a certain Pharnaeus from the province of Cyrrhestica, one of those pretending to be allies, was revealing to the Parthians all the preparations of his own army, he turned the treachery of the barbarian to his own advantage; for he pretended to be afraid that those things would happen which he was particularly desirous should happen, and pretended to desire those things to happen which he really dreaded. And so, fearful that the Parthians would cross the Euphrates before he could be reinforced by the legions which were stationed beyond the Taurus Mountains in Cappadocia, he earnestly endeavoured to make this traitor, according to his usual perfidy, advise the Parthians to lead their army across through Zeugma, where the route is shortest, and where the Euphrates flows in a deep channel; for he declared that, if the Parthians came by that road, he could avail himself of the protection of the hills for eluding their archers; but that he feared disaster if they should advance by the lower road through the open plains. Influenced by this information, the barbarians led their army by a circuitous route over the lower road, and spent above forty days in preparing materials and in constructing a bridge across the river at a point where the banks were quite widely separated and where the building of the bridge, therefore, involved more work. Ventidius utilized this interval for reuniting his forces, and having assembled these, three days before the Parthians arrived, he opened battle, conquered Pacorus, and killed him.

  [7] Mithridates, when he was blockaded by Pompey and planned to retreat the next day, wishing to conceal his purpose, made foraging expeditions over a wide territory, and even to the valleys adjacent to the enemy. For the purpose of further averting suspicion, he also arranged conferences for a subsequent date with several of his foes; and ordered numerous fires to be lighted throughout the camp. Then, in the second watch, he led out his forces directly past the camp of the enemy.

  [8] When the Emperor Caesar Domitianus Augustus Germanicus wished to crush the Germans, who were in arms, realizing that they would make greater preparations for war if they foresaw the arrival of so eminent a commander as himself, he concealed the reason for his departure from Rome under the pretext of taking a census of the Gallic provinces. Under cover of this he plunged into sudden warfare, crushed the ferocity of these savage tribes, and thus acted for the good of the provinces.

  [9] When it was essential that Hasdrubal and his troops should be destroyed before they joined Hannibal, the brother of Hasdrubal, Claudius Nero, lacking confidence in the troops under his own command, was therefore eager to unite his forces with those of his colleague, Livius Salinator, to whom the direction of the campaign had been committed. Desiring, however, that his departure should be unobserved by Hannibal, whose camp was opposite his, he chose ten thousand of his bravest soldiers, and gave orders to the lieutenants whom he left that the usual number of patrols and sentries be posted, the same number of fires lighted, and the usual appearance of the camp be maintained, in order that Hannibal might not become suspicious and venture to attack the few troops left behind. Then, when he joined his colleague in Umbria after secret marches, he forbade the enlargement of the camp, lest he give some sign of his arrival to the Carthaginian commander, who would be likely to refuse battle if he knew the forces of the consuls had been united. Accordingly, attacking the enemy unawares with his reinforced troops, he won the day and returned to Hannibal in advance of any news of his exploit. Thus by the same plan he stole a march on one of the two shrewdest Carthaginian generals and crushed the other.

  [10] Themistoc
les, urging upon his fellow-citizens the speedy construction of the walls which, at the command of the Lacedaemonians, they had demolished, informed the envoys sent from Sparta to remonstrate about this matter, that he himself would come, to put an end to this suspicion. Accordingly he came to Sparta. There, by feigning illness, he secured a considerable delay. But after he realized that his subterfuge was suspected, he declared that the rumour which had come to the Spartans was false, and asked them to send some of their leading men, whose word they would take about the building operations of the Athenians. Then he wrote secretly to the Athenians, telling them to detain those who had come to them, until, upon the restoration of the walls, he could admit to the Spartans that Athens was fortified, and could inform them that their leaders could not return until he himself had been sent back. These terms the Spartans readily fulfilled, that they might not atone for the death of one by that of many.

  [11] Lucius Furius, having led his army into an unfavourable position, determined to conceal his anxiety, lest the others take alarm. By gradually changing his course, as though planning to attack the enemy after a wider circuit, he finally reversed his line of march, and led his army safely back, without its knowing what was going on.

  [12] When Metellus Pius was in Spain and was asked what he was going to do the next day, he replied: “If my tunic could tell, I would burn it.”

  [13] When Marcus Licinius Crassus was asked at what time he was going to break camp, he replied: “Are you afraid you’ll not hear the trumpet?”

  II. On Finding Out the Enemy’s Plans

  [1] Scipio Africanus, seizing the opportunity of sending an embassy to Syphax, commanded specially chosen tribunes and centurions to go with Laelius, disguised as slaves and entrusted with the task of spying out the strength of the king. These men, in order to examine more freely the situation of the camp, purposely let loose a horse and chased it around the greatest part of the fortifications, pretending it was running away. After they had reported the results of their observations, the destruction of the camp by fire brought the war to a close.